Why Golan Demilitarization would not Work
A Jurisprudential Memorandum

Faced with mounting and seemingly interminable losses in Lebanon, the Netanyahu Government may soon consider a withdrawal from the Golan Heights in order to reach a peace agreement with Syria. Such a withdrawal, from an area less the 1% of Syria's total size, would leave the northern region of Israel open to Syrian, Iraqi and/or Iranian invasions through the Jordan Valley. Moreover, such a withdrawal would destroy and uproot 32 Golan Jewish communities and threaten a third of Israel's water supply.

Leaving aside the importance of the Golan in Jewish history, the immediate issue is one of security. In this connection, a number of remedies have been proposed to compensate Israel for "returning" the Golan to Syria with a broad variety of technical means and/or with a U.S. military presence in the area. In essence, the quid pro quo for Israel here would be a demilitarization of the plateau, which is roughly the size of New York City's borough of Queens. The problem with such demilitarization, as with the increasingly discussed demilitarization proposals for a Palestinian state, is that it would not work. Unlike the problem of Palestinian demilitarization, however, the issue here has nothing to do with the transforming "legal personality" of one of the parties (as states, both parties to a Golan withdrawal agreement would, of course, possess full legal personality), but rather with more traditional concerns over the obligations of "good faith" (pacta sunt servanda) and associated issues of enforcement. Further, the problem of Golan demilitarization stems, in part, from the predictable shortcomings of international guarantees in a world where the very idea of an "international community" has become self- contradictory.

A Golan agreement with Syria could permit Israel to operate its essential early-warning stations, but these facilities would not be an adequate substitute for an effective defense. Moreover, in order to get such permission, Syria might be offered certain reciprocal ground station oppotunities. Indeed, back in July 1995 then Prime Minister Rabin even offered the Syrians stations of their own within pre-1967 Israel as compensation.

For real security, the IDF must retain its positions on the Golan for constant surveillance of the Syrian army. Pre - 1967 warning stations do not have a clear line of sight deep into Syrian territory. Not surprisingly, a large number of former Israeli intelligence officers, regardless of party affiliation, oppose any Israeli dependence upon third parties for information concerned with survival decisions. A demilitarized Golan with early warning based upon an expanded American role and/or even the most technologically advanced systems, including satellites, would not be enough. In the event of a warning failure, which is always possible (e.g., the case in 1973), Syrian tanks might proceed into Israel unopposed.

What about American troops on a demilitarized Golan? Stationed in a very small area, such deployment would likely place these troops in grave danger from well-armed terrorists and proxies of hostile regimes. More than likely, American forces would be drawn into both inter-Arab and Arab- Israeli disputes, and soon the American public would be demanding the return home of its soldiers. Further, Israel's military dependence upon the United States would grow to unmanageable levels, and Syria might come to see the American presence as an affront to its own sovereignty. In that event, President Assad or his successor could be expected to push for removal of the U.S. force, a demand similar to Egypt's 1967 demand for U.N. withdrawal from Sinai - the demand that led to the Six-Day War.

For these reasons, as well as for the aforementioned liabilities of early-warning systems in the hands of non-Israelis, a demilitarized Golan could not assure Israel's basic security from aggression. According to a 1995 statement by four Israeli (res.) generals, "Israel's presence on the Golan Heights constitutes the optimal strategic balance with Syria and insurance against a massive Syrian attack. The IDF's proximity to Damascus is also a guarantee against a Syrian missile launch into Israel's rear. Any change in this balance would lessen Israel's deterrent against potential Syrian aggression and jeopardize the quiet and stability that have characterized the Golan since 1974." As for the use of American troops: "Involving American troops on the Golan Heights, whether as `monitors' or `peacekeepers' or in some other role, would be a blunder. The Golan Heights is entirely unlike the broad, empty Sinai Desert, in which Americans currently participate in the Multinational Force Organization."

The Golan, which ranges up to a height of 2300 feet, dominates the Jordan Valley, the lowest point on Earth. On this strategic plateau, there are only two natural terrain bottlenecks. These choke points are defensible. But with the Golan in Syrian hands, however "demilitarized," thousands of enemy tanks, backed up by missiles and aircraft, could still overrun Israel. This could be the case even if, in the best-case demilitarization scenario, Israel were allowed to man its own early-warning assets, a highly improbable scenario.

Finally, any Israeli agreement to Golan demilitarization would be exceedingly problematic under Israeli law. In 1981, the Knesset adopted a revised penal code. Chapter 7, titled "Security of the State, Foreign Relations and Official Secrets," includes paragraphs which were incorporated verbatim from earlier revisions of the penal code adopted in 1957. Paragraph 97b reads as follows: "Anyone who does something with the intention of removing territory from the sovereignty of the state or making that territory part of the sovereignty of a foreign state or has performed an act that is likely to bring this about - the penalty is death or life imprisonment."

The Golan Plateau (unlike Judea and Samaria which, except for eastern Jerusalem and its environs, were never incorporated into Israel) is an integral part of Israel's sovereign territory, annexed by the Knesset on December 14, 1981. The Law of Ramat HaGolan, adopted on that date, says: "The law and jurisdiction and administration of the state will apply to the territory of the Golan." When certain Israeli opponents of the annexation argued that application of Israeli law did not apply sovereignty, the Israeli Supreme Court ruled against them. Said the Court: "Wherever in the law it says Israel or the State of Israel, Ramat HaGolan is included."

Demilitarization, both of the emerging Palestinian state and the Golan Heights, can never be consistent with Israel's compelling security needs. From the standpoint of international law, both expressions of demilitarization would cause great strategic difficulties for Israel. Recognizing this, it is now up to the government of Israel to ensure that the security of the State be protected by means other than demilitarization, primarily by the refusal to enter into any agreements that would require surrender of Israeli territory to enemy populations.

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