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The Conventional Wisdom is Wrong
Walter Laqueur
Conventional wisdom now says that the U.S. ought to form as wide a coalition as possible as it prepares to do battle against terrorist forces around the world. It also praises the United States for having the forbearance to wait until the culprits for the attacks on Washington and New York are identified before firing the first retaliatory missile. Above all, goes on received wisdom, let's not hit the innocent, and let's do something to correct the "causes" of terrorism. And, for God's sakes, don't single out Islam. These are all sensible propositions put forward by men of good will. They also couldn't be more wrong. To start with the top one, the idea of establishing a broad coalition of civilized nations is nothing less than an invitation for paralysis. This includes even a coalition of Western governments. Some of America's European allies, Britain first and foremost, will give America critical support. Others, however, will be reluctant. And all, even Britain, will insist on having their say before decisions are taken. Already, even before the dead are buried, voices are heard saying that the main assignment is to prevent America from acting hastily and indiscriminately. Keep a "cool head" advises German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer. Reaction should be proportionate, say others.
But what is proportionate? About twice as many people were killed in New York as in Pearl Harbor, and all were civilians. Proportionate means civilian casualties. But members of the coalition will insist on not harming the innocent. They will also demand foolproof evidence, but even if this evidence is forthcoming in a timely fashion, they will think of other reasons for inaction. All these wishes are, of course, wholly justified. They also mean that the terrorists have nothing to fear and that Saddam Hussein can sleep in peace. That he supports terrorism against the United States can hardly be doubted. Yet evidence of his direct involvement in last week's attacks may never be obtained. A coalition is never stronger than its weakest link, and this coalition will consist of many weak links. This will be especially the case if America draws Muslim and Arab countries into the coalition as it did at the time of the Gulf War. Again, this is a most sensible proposition -- and again, it is quite unrealistic. Some Muslim governments abhor terrorists, no doubt, but they fear public opinion even more. They assume that if they were to cooperate with the West against the terrorists, there would be violent demonstrations and they might be toppled. They remember the fate of King Abdullah of Jordan, of Anwar Sadat and many other Arab and Muslim leaders. They know that other governments that sympathize with the fundamentalists are prepared to help their overthrow. Could America have reacted any other way? If it had indiscriminately retaliated within a day or two after the attack in Manhattan and Washington against any of the governments suspected of aiding international terrorism (and it is well known who they are) there would have been a terrific outcry about American insanity and cruelty. It would have quickly died down. It also would have had a considerable effect. Terrorism is not based on common sense and elementary logic, and neither is effective counterterrorism. The paradoxical and perverse lessons of history is that retaliating against those who were only marginally involved in a terrorist act may have a considerably beneficial impact. The U.S. attacked Colonel Moammar Gadhafi's Libya in 1986 after the bombing of West Berlin discotheque, even though Gadhafi, a veteran supporter of global terrorism, may have been innocent in this specific case. The U.S. in 1998 also bombed a pharmaceutical factory in Sudan in the mistaken assumption that it was manufacturing poison gas after the attack on the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi. What was the result of these American mistakes? Both Libya and Sudan went out of the terrorism business. The other principals too took fright -- at least for a while. America was hitting back when attacked. The real perpetrators of those crimes rightly assumed that the next time they would become targets. The next fallacy holds that today's terrorists must have a good reason to be willing to die. Is it not true that America and the West have ignored their grievances? If the alliance is wide, questions such as this one will be heard often. Grievances and rage do exist. The Islamic countries, once in the forefront of human civilization, have sadly fallen behind politically, economically, culturally -- across the board -- not only in comparison with the West but also the Far East. What binds together the societies that throughout history have been willing to commit suicide terrorism -- the Assassins in the Middle Ages, the Irish terrorists in the 19th century, the Tamil Tigers today -- is a lack of self criticism. The fault always must belong to a foreign power. These are the roots of the rage and the grievances in some Muslim countries and there is little that outsiders can do to change this state of affairs. There are a great many groups and minorities all over the world who have more legitimate grievances and yet they do not commit terrorism. Mention of the other groups reminds us that the willingness to commit suicide is by no means an Islamic monopoly. A network of aggressive radicals is the enemy, not Islam, a religion as respectable as any other. But we should not be blinded to the fact that terrorists today are found primarily in Muslim countries or in countries in which Muslims coexist with people of other backgrounds. This is true for almost 90% of all violent conflicts in the contemporary world. Even in Western European countries such as Britain, France and Germany as well as the United States, the gospel of terrorist violence is now preached from Mosques and so-called Islamic cultural centers. This is tolerated in the name of multiculturalism. The chance for immediate retribution has now been missed, so what can be done now? To bomb Afghan cities would be the height of folly. What can be gained from hitting cities like Kabul and Kandahar or villages in a country that has already been reduced to a stone-age level? Osama bin Laden and his henchmen ought to be relentlessly pursued. But the U.S. should know that a limited action, such as the landing of special units in an area in which bin Laden is reported to be hiding, will be risky and its success uncertain.
And anyway the principal target should not be this Saudi fanatic, whose importance has been grossly exaggerated. The target is the terrorist underworld in which he has operated. It is perfectly true, as bin Laden himself says, that if he is eliminated others will to continue his jihad against the "Great Satan" and the various other small Satans. Bin Laden and the other radical groups have great support throughout the Muslim world. Many of the younger generation have been indoctrinated to hate the West and its values and are willing to fight for its destruction. The well-meaning people counseling dialogue forget that the Manhattan attack was not the beginning of a new era, but that it was carried out with old weapons. There is reason to assume that next time weapons of mass destruction will be used, given that repeat attacks from the air will now be more difficult. American planners ought to think about prevention. The campaign facing America could be compared to the draining of a swamp. It will mean, among other things, preventing the transfer of money and above all technology to terrorists. Without state help, the capacity of the terrorists will be very much reduced. Hence the need to deal with the states that protect and assist the terrorists. They should be under constant observation and threat of massive punishment. If this means hitting Baghdad, so be it. There is more than a grain of truth in Cicero's Oderint dum metuant (let them hate as long as they are afraid). At present the terrorists and their protectors are not really afraid. Not because they are brave but because they live in a fantasy world and it might be necessary to spell out the consequences of their actions in detail. Mr. Laqueur is author, among other books, of "The New Terrorism; Fanaticism and the Weapons of Mass Destruction," (Oxford Univ Press).
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