Terrorism on Trial
Daniel Pipes and Steven Emerson (WSJ)
June 10, 2001
On Tuesday, a federal jury in New York returned a guilty verdict against
the four defendants accused of plotting the terrorist bombing, three
years ago, of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The successful
prosecution of these murderers represents a great victory for the United
States, for the principle of justice, and for the rule of law. We are
all in debt to the brave and capable prosecutors.
Operational Range
Unfortunately, the trial does almost nothing to enhance the safety of
Americans. The Qaeda group, headed by the notorious Osama bin Laden,
which perpetrated the outrages in East Africa, will barely notice the
loss of four operatives. Indeed, recent information shows that Al-Qaeda
is not only planning new attacks on the U.S. but is also expanding its
operational range to countries such as Jordan and Israel.
In Israel, for example, bin Laden has begun to develop a network among
the terrorists of the Hamas organization. Last year, Israel arrested a
Hamas member named Nabil Aukel who was trained in Pakistan and then
moved to Afghanistan and Kashmir to put that training into practice. He
returned to Israel with well-honed skills in the remote detonation of
bombs using cellular phones, and was detailed to carry out terrorist
attacks in Israel.
Perhaps the real importance of the New York trial lies not in the guilty
verdicts but in the extraordinary information made public through court
exhibits and trial proceedings. These have given us a riveting view onto
the shadowy world of Al-Qaeda-though you'd never know from following the
news media, for this information was barely reported. Tens of thousands
of pages from the trial transcript provide a full and revealing picture
of Al-Qaeda, showing it to be the most lethal terrorist organization
anywhere in the world.
They demonstrate that Al-Qaeda sees the West in general, and the U.S. in
particular, as the ultimate enemy of Islam. Inspired by their victory
over the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s, the leaders of
Al-Qaeda aspire to a similar victory over America, hoping ultimately to
bring Islamist rule here. Toward this end, they engaged in many attacks
on American targets from 1993 to 1998. One striking piece of information
that came out in the trial was bin Laden's possible connection to the
World Trade Center bombing in New York in 1993. A terrorist manual
introduced as evidence was just an updated version of an earlier manual
found in the possession of the World Trade Center defendants.
The court evidence shows how Al-Qaeda is an umbrella organization that
includes a wide range of Islamist groups, including Hezbollah (Lebanon),
Islamic Jihad (Egypt), the Armed Islamic Group (Algeria), as well as a
raft of Iraqis, Sudanese, Pakistanis, Afghans and Jordanians. Each of
its constituent groups has the capability to carry out its own
independent recruiting and operations.
The groups coordinate through Al-Qaeda's "Shura Council," a kind of
board of directors that includes representatives from the many groups.
The groups meet on a regular basis in Afghanistan to review and approve
proposed operations. Most of them have maintained close relationships
with each other since the end of the war in Afghanistan against the
Soviets. They know each other well and work together efficiently.
We learned from the trial that when operations in one place are shut
down, the rest of the network soldiers on, virtually unaffected. Even if
bin Ladin himself were to be killed, this Islamist network would survive
and continue to expand, sustained by its ideological adhesion. Islamism
is the glue that keeps these groups together, and fired up.
The court documents also revealed that although bin Laden has had a
leading role in formulating and paying for Al-Qaeda, the organization
did rely heavily on state sponsorship as well. For example, Sudanese
President Omar Bashir himself authorized Al-Qaeda activities in his
country and gave it special authority to avoid paying taxes or import
duties. More remarkably, he exempted the organization from local law
enforcement. Officials of the Iranian government helped arrange advanced
weapons and explosives training for Al-Qaeda personnel in Lebanon where
they learned, for example, how to destroy large buildings.
Perhaps the most disconcerting revelations from the trial concern
Al-Qaeda's entrenchment in the West. For example, its procurement
network for such materiel as night vision goggles, construction
equipment, cell phones, and satellite telephones was based mostly in the
U.S., Britain, France, Germany, Denmark, Bosnia and Croatia. The
chemicals purchased for use in the manufacture of chemical weapons came
from the Czech Republic.
In the often long waits between terrorist attacks, Al-Qaeda's member
organizations maintained operational readiness by acting under the cover
of front-company businesses and nonprofit, tax-deductible religious
charities. These nongovernmental groups, many of them still operating,
are based mainly in the U.S. and Britain, as well as in the Middle East.
The Qatar Charitable Society, for example, has served as one of bin
Laden's de facto banks for raising and transferring funds.
Osama bin Laden also set up a tightly organized system of cells in an
array of American cities, including Brooklyn, N.Y.; Orlando, Fla.;
Dallas; Santa Clara, Calif.; Columbia, Mo., and Herndon, Va.
Several conclusions follow from this information.
First, we should think of Al-Qaeda not as an organization dominated by
one man but as a global Islamist "Internet" with gateways and access
points around the world.
Second, Al-Qaeda has a world-wide operational reach. Especially
noteworthy is its success in the U.S. and Europe, where it recruits
primarily (as this trial showed) among Muslim immigrants. The legal
implications of this fact are as serious as they are delicate. Clearly,
this is a major new area for law enforcement to grapple with.
Larger Point
Finally, this trial shows that trials alone are not enough. In
conceptualizing the Al-Qaeda problem only in terms of law enforcement,
the U.S. government misses the larger point: Yes, the operatives engage
in crimes, but they are better thought of as soldiers, not criminals. To
fight Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups requires an understanding that
they (along with some states) have silently declared war on the U.S.; in
turn, we must fight them as we would in a war.
Seeing acts of terror as battles, not crimes, improves the U.S. approach
to this problem. It means that, as in a conventional war, America's
armed forces, not its policemen and lawyers, are primarily deployed to
protect Americans. Rather than drag low-level operatives into American
courtrooms, the military will defend us overseas. If a perpetrator is
not precisely known, then those who are known to harbor terrorists will
be punished. This way, governments and organizations that support
terrorism will pay the price, not just the individuals who carry it out.
This way, too, Americans will gain a safety that presently eludes them,
no matter how many high-profile courtroom victories prosecutors win.
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