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Soap Bubble #194
Boris Shusteff
When the ship of Barak's diplomacy sank after hitting the reef of the "Palestinian Hope," known by its code name "the refugees' right of return," very few people realized that this so-called "right" is nothing but a soap bubble. Sometimes one can't stop wondering how the Arabs time and again keep selling the same old junk to the Jews, and the Jews excitedly keep buying it, believing that they are getting a priceless treasure. Not only the Jews, but the whole world, mesmerized by Arab propaganda, keeps repeating in chorus with the Arabs that UN Resolution 194 supports "the right of return for the Palestinian refugees." What can be simpler than reading the Resolution itself before coming up with any conclusions? Maybe then it will become clear why on December 11, 1948, when the Resolution was put to a vote in the UN, the representatives of the Arab countries unanimously rejected it. The reason for the Arab action was clear. The truth is that the issue of the refugees was a low priority issue, only briefly mentioned in the Resolution. The bulk of the Resolution had as its purpose the establishment of a "Conciliation Commission," whose role was to facilitate the achievement of peace between Israel and the Arab states. And in 1948, it would have been ridiculous to expect the Arabs to vote for peace with Israel. The Resolution itself is a document that spells out in each and every one of its Articles what the Conciliation Commission ought to do about trying to reconcile the opposing parties. In Article 5, for example, it recommends that the Israelis and the Arabs "seek agreement by negotiations conducted either with the Conciliation Commission or directly, with a view to the final settlement of all questions outstanding between them"(1). Article 6 instructs the Commission "to take steps to assist the Governments and authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them"(1). On January 31, 1961, then Israeli Ambassador to Canada Yaakov Herzog, in his famous debate with Professor Toynbee at McGill University in Montreal, gave an all-encompassing explanation of the essence of Resolution 194. He said, "The General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948 established the Palestine Conciliation Commission to deal with the whole complex of problems that had arisen between Israel and the Arab states. They were to serve as mediators, and the parties were asked in the Resolution to negotiate directly and find a solution to all these problems. Within the context of this Resolution the refugee problem is referred to and the Commission was supposed to study the possibilities either of repatriation or of compensation, but all this within the general context of the peace settlement" (2). Each article of the Resolution described a certain task, associated with the suggested activity of the Conciliation Commission itself. Of its fifteen articles, only one - the eleventh - spoke about refugees. What is very important, is that the adjectives "Arab" or "Palestinian" pertaining to the noun "refugees" were suspiciously absent. Efraim Karsh, head of Mediterranean studies at King's College at the University of London wrote in the May, 2001 issue of "Commentary" magazine that the language of the Resolution "could as readily apply to the hundreds of thousands of Jews who were then being driven from Arab states in revenge for the situation in Palestine"(3). Karsh explained further that this interpretation is not a mere fantasy. The Resolution clearly stipulated that compensation for the property of those refugees "choosing not to return... should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible" (1). Karsh wrote: "Had the provision applied only to Palestinians, Israel would surely have been singled out as the compensating party; instead, the wording clearly indicates that Arab states were likewise seen as potential compensators of refugees created by them." (3) What is even more important, Resolution 194 in no way envisioned "repatriation" as the only solution. On the contrary, the Conciliation Commission was instructed "to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation" (1). Moreover, the option of "repatriation" was to be applied only to refugees "wishing to... live at peace with their neighbors"(1), and the repatriation itself was supposed to happen "at the earliest practicable date" (1). The vague formula "at the earliest practicable date" only emphasized that the "resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees" was at least an equal option to repatriation. This can be proven by the fact that "the General Assembly, in its Resolution 393(V) of 1950, called for the 'reintegration of the refugees into the economic life of the Near East.'" (4) Abba Eban wrote in his book Voice of Israel: "Each year since 1950 the General Assembly has repeated its exhortations to the host governments to facilitate the reintegration into their economies of the refugees living on their soil...; to allow them to realize the opportunities existing in Arab economies for the beneficial absorption of the refugees." (4) Resolution 194 died immediately after it was born. The Arabs were never able to even force themselves to announce that they would live in peace with Israel. They completely rejected the possibility of negotiating with the Jews directly and the Palestine Conciliation Commission was never functional. However, even this is not all. From the standpoint of international law, as we are reminded in Karsh's article, like all General Assembly resolutions, UN Resolution 194 "is an expression of sentiment and carries no binding force whatsoever." (3) The fact that General Assembly resolutions are non-binding was especially adamantly supported by the Arabs themselves. For instance the Arabs were absolutely opposed to Resolution 181, which recommended the partition of Palestine into two states. In addition to military aggression against the newly-born Jewish state, they launched a diplomatic attack in the UN. The President of Lebanon declared from the UN podium, "The General Assembly's resolution of 1947 is a mere recommendation ... it should be examined in the light of other recommendations of the General Assembly which have not been accepted by the country or groups of countries concerned and which have not been implemented." (4) The views of the Foreign Minister of Egypt at that time were even more categorical and are on record in the documents of the UN. He declared, "No one can say that compliance is imperative or that the States which do not comply with Assembly recommendations are acting against the Charter or undermining the structure of the United Nations. No one can speak of the General Assembly's resolutions as if they were obligatory decisions ... the Charter and the United Nations will not crumble, will not fall apart if one or more of the General Assembly's resolutions is not put into effect." (4) It is time to bring the issue to a close. The Conciliation Commission, the formation of which was the main purpose of Resolution 194, does not exist. The Arab refugees do not want to live in peace with their Jewish neighbors, which has been demonstrated by countless polls conducted among them. After nearly 20,000 days have passed since the appearance of the stillborn resolution, any possibility for an "earliest practicable date" is long gone. And of course the United Nations will not crumble, will not fall apart if one of the General Assembly's resolutions is not put into effect. The Resolution 194 was a mere soap bubble from the very beginning. Time for the bubble to burst.
1. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) 11 December 1948. http://www.mideastweb.org/194.htm 2. Speeches & Writings of Yaacov Herzog. "A People that Dwells Alone." Weidenfield and Nicolson, London, 1975. 3. Efraim Karsh. The Palestinians and the "Right of Return." "Commentary." May, 2001. 4. Abba Eban. Voice of Israel. Horizon Press, New York, 1957.
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