The Chief of Staff's Double War

Amir Oren (Ha'aretz)
May 25, 2000

The General Staff compound, Israel's nerve center at times of war, began operating on Monday, after orders to that effect were given by the Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Shaul Mofaz. As during war, round-the-clock assessments of the situation on the ground are being made in the compound.

At night, three officers rotate shifts while supervising the headquarters - Mofaz, Deputy Chief of Staff, Major General Uzi Dayan, and Head of Operations Directorate, Major General Giora Eiland.

A crisis atmosphere has engulfed the IDF, a sense of concern which is just a notch below war-time alert.

Mofaz, who just a few short months ago thought that he would become the "Chief of Staff of Peace," has perused newspapers this week, only to discover that he's the Chief of Staff of Humiliation. He spoke about "redeployment," and got "collapse" instead.

Mofaz is currently doing battle in two wars.

One is against external enemies - Hezbollah, Syria, the Palestinians. The second is against the political leadership, which compelled him to undertake a military action that he has regarded all along to be a mistake.

Senior officers, both in the General Staff and the Northern Command, are currently furious with their former commander, Ehud Barak. Half a year ago, they kept misgivings about the withdrawal plan in check, deferring to Barak's authority as a leader elected on an explicit platform.

As months went by, their anger mounted, especially when Barak deferred their requests relating to timely preparations for a one-sided withdrawal. They believe that the events of recent days would have been avoided, had the IDF been allowed to assume unilaterally new configurations months ago, instead of just a few weeks ago.

Mofaz received a measure of compensation when he gained status as Barak's partner concerning the decision to bring IDF troops home.

The cabinet, which authorized the Prime Minister to decide about the timing and logistics of the withdrawal in consultation with the Chief of Staff, gave Mofaz quasi-veto power. This veto power enables him to quash further delays which might be prudent politically, but dangerous militarily.

From Barak's standpoint, success will be measured in terms of redeeming his vow to "bring the boys home." But from Mofaz's vantage point, and also that of Northern Commander, Major General Gaby Ashkenazy, the key standard is minimizing casualties and injuries sustained while the pull-out is carried out.

With this standard in mind, Ashkenazy spoke urgently to anyone who would listen yesterday, imploring that the pull-out be accelerated, so as to preempt a hellish scenario of Hezbollah suicide attacks, car bombs, and kidnapping of soldiers.

As Mofaz spoke to reporters yesterday about needing a week to complete the pull-out, on a base by base approach, a clumsy attempt to confuse the enemy punctuated his remarks. It's widely understood that the moment the Security Council gives Israel the final go-ahead, the evacuation can be completed in a number of hours.

June 6 will mark the 18th anniversary of the Lebanon War. It would have been a fitting date to complete the pullout; but, as always, events in Lebanon have proven recalcitrant, following their own chaotic logic. This isn't the end of the story. It is the conclusion of a chapter.

Mofaz yesterday told both the Syrians, and Israel's cabinet, what he'll recommend in days ahead, should fighting escalate. His comments were meant to make life difficult for Nasrallah, and Assad; but they also spell trouble for Prime Minister Barak. Barak now faces a bitter, disappointed army, and it's not the SLA.

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