|
|
On Making Peace Despite the Risks
Ze'ev Schiff (Haaretz)
In August 1994, five days before cancer took the life of Major-General (res.) and Professor Yehoshafat Harkabi, I visited him at Jerusalem's Hadassah Hospital. Harkabi, formerly chief of military intelligence in the Israel Defense Forces, was a specialist in Middle Eastern studies and a professor of strategic studies. His research work drew the public's attention to the Palestinian Covenant, which denied Israel's right to exist, and he wrote extensively on Arab hatred of both Israel and Judaism. Over the years, he became considerably more moderate and began to support major concessions to the Arabs. On the eve of his death, Israel found itself in a crisis with the Palestinians over implementation of the Oslo agreement. My conversation with Harkabi on the day of that visit can be viewed in a way as his last political will and testament. What he said then has acquired immense relevance in view of the failure of the Camp David summit. "Until there is peace between Israel and the Palestinians," he said to me, "none of our agreements with any of the Arab states will be worth a dime. On the other hand, peace with the Palestinians will open the door to an entirely new era for Israel. I am troubled by the fact that the Israeli public does not see things this way." "Are you confident that the Palestinians will honor any agreement we sign with them?" I asked Harkabi. "I mean, look at all the agreements that the Palestinians have signed in the past - in Lebanon and in Jordan, with the Egyptians and with the Syrians, and what about the relations between the Palestinians and the Kuwaitis? In one way or another, the Palestinians have violated every agreement, written or verbal, they have been a party to. How can you trust them?" Harkabi reflected for a moment and then replied: "No, I am afraid that I do not have any faith in them. We must exercise the utmost caution. Nonetheless, I believe that it is important that we take a giant step in their direction and that we take a risk that perhaps we will be able to overcome in the long run anyway." This paradox has lingered with us and has not disappeared even after the failure of the Camp David talks. That summit put an end to the approach that had been prevalent among supporters of the peace process, according to which only Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat has the power to sign agreements and to honor them. This assumption was the basis of the belief that the opportunity for peace must be seized while Arafat remains leader and enjoys a broad consensus. Now it is being said that Arafat is afraid of an across-the-board compromise and that he complicated the Jerusalem issue even further by tossing the ball into the court of the Arab states, each one of which has a unique agenda on that issue. None of the Arab leaders to whom the Americans turned, including Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, had any constructive proposals to offer concerning the Jerusalem question. A huge question mark hovers not only over Arafat but over all the members of the old-guard leadership of the Palestinian people, including those who see themselves as his successors, such as Abu Mazen and Abu Ala. An intellectual who is considered an enthusiastic supporter of the peace process, Abu Ala has recently forwarded the absurd argument that Israel plans to demolish the mosques on the Temple Mount. What is particularly disturbing is that not one member of the younger generation of Palestinian leaders stood up and openly said to Arafat that a compromise solution with Israel was workable and that the Palestinian people would be prepared to accept such a solution. In the Israeli delegation to Camp David, on the other hand, there were those who actively encouraged Prime Minister Ehud Barak to make compromises. The failure of the Camp David summit also exposed the fact that, despite the long-standing close collaboration between Palestinians and Israelis, neither side really understands the unique importance that Jerusalem holds for the other. The Americans have frequently argued that the Syrians know relatively little about Israel but that the Palestinians know a lot about us. Now it emerges that this is not an accurate picture at all. Although Palestinians and Israelis know the various minute components in the approach of the other side to Jerusalem, neither party has a true appreciation of the deep aspirations and the constraints of the other over the Jerusalem issue. Before the Camp David conference, Israeli military intelligence correctly assessed that Arafat's maneuverability over Jerusalem would be extremely limited. Because the Palestinian leader was hamstrung regarding that question, any possibility of developing a creative proposal enabling a compromise was automatically ruled out for this high-level meeting. It was very depressing to see the Palestinians return to square one over another sensitive issue: the Palestinian refugees' "right of return" to their former homes in Israel. On this subject, the Palestinian delegates at Camp David denied everything that their leaders had promised in the informal talks that have been held ever since the signing of the Oslo agreement. |